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Abstract 
This paper examines real effective exchange rate (REER) responses to shocks in exchange rate 
determinants for the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) over the period 1980-2015. The analysis is 
based on a country-by-country VECM, and oil price, supply and demand shocks are identified using 
long run restrictions in a structural VAR model. We report significant differences in the response of 
REER to real oil price, productivity (supply) and demand preference shocks across these economies.  
In addition the relative contribution of these shocks to REER movements in the short and long run  
appears to be different across economies. Our findings suggest that the WAMZ countries are 
structurally different, and asymmetric shocks with inadequate adjustment mechanisms imply that a 
monetary union would be costly.  
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1 Introduction  
In this paper, we focus on one of the main issues in the debate of the monetary union in WAMZ, the 
degree of asymmetry in macroeconomic shocks. The West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)1 
composed of 6 countries, created in 2000 as a second monetary zone in addition to an already 
existing West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).2 The project is aimed to fast track 
and facilitate the deepening of economic integration in the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS). The intention is that WAMZ and WAEMU will be merged to form a single 
monetary zone in West Africa by 2020 to enable members to exploit both institutional and economic 
benefits (Debrun et al. 2005; Fielding and Shields 2005; Masson and Pattillo 2005; Masson 2008; 
Couharde et al. 2013; Ekpo and Udoh 2014).  
The main economic cost of a monetary union to WAMZ results from the loss of independent national 
monetary policy, and the associated nominal exchange rate flexibility, as policy instruments to 
asymmetric shocks (Buiter 2000; De Grauwe 2000; De Grauwe and Mongelli 2005; Rubio and 
Comunale 2017). The degree of the cost depends on the debate about the relative merit or 
effectiveness of nominal exchange rate flexibility as a buffer for adjusting to asymmetric shocks, 
especially for small open economies (Obstfeld et al. 1996; Kamar and Ben Naceur 2007; Beetsma 
and Giuliodori 2010; Gervais et al. 2016).3 On the other hand, the more similar these countries are in 
terms of structural measures, such as sufficiently flexible labour and capital markets, (Mundell 1961; 
McKinnon 1963; Kenen 1969); the existence of adequate shock absorbing mechanisms, such as 
interregional risk-sharing arrangement and automatic fiscal transfer schemes, (Kenen 1969; Mundell 
1973; Mélitz and Zumer 1999)4 and the presence of common shocks with a similar impact, the lower 
the costs in losing exchange rate stabilizing mechanisms for these economies (Tavlas 1993; Alesina 
and Barro 2002; Tavlas 2009; Clerc et al. 2011).  
                                                          
1 WAMZ members: Ghana, The Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The formation of the WAMZ was 
accompanied with Maastricht type convergence criteria, whose achievements by the six member states are decisive for the 
prospective monetary union (See Oshikoya 2010).  
2 WAEMU members (former French colonies) are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and 
Togo; established in 1994 with a central bank and a single currency known as the CFA franc. 
3 Coulibaly and Gnimassoun (2013) detailed the frequent used of exchange rates by WAMZ countries to response to economic 
shocks. For instance, during the 2016 falling oil prices, Nigeria floated its fixed currency exchange rate to correct a current 
account imbalance. The floating of the Nigerian naira after months of policy debates saw the currency immediately plummet by 
40% (Lumkile 2016). 
4 Such an adjustment mechanism could be in terms of a unified budget, which automatically redistributes from countries 
experiencing a strong economy to those suffering from a recession. However, De Grauwe (2000) argues that fiscal transfers 
are only suited to dealing with temporary demand shocks. When the shock is a permanent one, other adjustment mechanisms 
will be necessary to deal with the problem (Volz 2010). 
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In West Africa, the degree of risk-sharing among these countries is quite low (Tapsoba 2011). The 
political convergence in terms of having a unified budget to facilitate financial transfers from countries 
experiencing a strong economy to those suffering from a recession is hindered by high government 
debts, which are typical in developing countries including the ones studied here (Buigut and Valev 
2005; Houssa 2008). Though data on factor movement in the region is sparse,5 it is unrealistic to 
assume that workers will move quickly from one country to another, even if there are no border 
barriers due to significant costs, such as for migration and retraining (Kenen and Meade 2008). 
Consequently, the optimal currency area (OCA) literature points to the importance of symmetry in 
macroeconomic shocks of monetary union candidates. If shocks are symmetric across countries,  like 
a negative demand shock that is common to all WAMZ countries, then a symmetrical policy response 
in the form of a common monetary and fiscal expansion would be adequate. However, if shocks are 
highly idiosyncratic, a common monetary policy will be inappropriate (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
1992; Buiter 1997; Pisani-Ferry 2013). This is the proposition that because of divergences in 
economic structure (sectoral or industrial composition of production, financial structure, demand, 
labour market institutions etc.), the monetary transmission mechanism differs among countries. 
Consequently, a common monetary policy will impact asymmetrically on different countries and 
sectors (Buiter 2000). 
A relatively few empirical studies have used the dynamics of various macroeconomic variables to help 
assess asymmetry of WAMZ economies and have produced inconclusive results. For instance, 
(Alagidede et al. 2008; Tsangarides and Qureshi 2008; Asongu 2014; Harvey and Cushing 2015) 
have revealed the existence of high levels of macroeconomic heterogeneity due to the diverse 
economic structures of the West African countries, especially those belonging to the WAMZ. Others  
like Debrun et al. 2005; Coulibaly and Gnimassoun 2013 have reported evidence of macroeconomic 
convergence regarding competitiveness since the establishment of WAMZ convergence criteria in 
2001. This paper provides a contemporary examination of the degree of asymmetry by assessing the 
behaviour of the real effective exchange rates (REER) across WAMZ countries. The dynamics of 
REER can have considerable effects on output and prices; providing evidence on REER behaviour 
among prospective monetary union candidates would suggest the potential costs of sacrificing 
                                                          
5 Adepoju (2005) documents movement of a significant amount of labour from Ghana to Nigeria during the 1970s oil price 
boom. Intraregional movements of people within the group has been made easy with the introduction of ECOWAS common 
passport since 2000. 
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exchange rate flexibility. A stable and coordinated REER between these countries would suggest that 
shocks demanding exchange rate adjustment are small, and, consequently, that the cost of giving up 
nominal exchange rate flexibility would be small. Conversely, large divergent REER can generate 
competitiveness differentials among candidates, and would indicate the importance of exchange rate 
flexibility (Edwards 1988b; Von Hagen and Neumann 1994; De Grauwe 1996; Balázs and Amina 
2003; Coudert and Couharde 2003; Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009; Lane 2012; Dumrongrittikul and 
Anderson 2016).  
Several approaches have improved our understanding of the link between exchange rates and 
macroeconomic fundamentals such as; productivity, terms of trade, trade liberalization, government 
consumption, oil price, and interest rates. (Edwards 1988b; MacDonald 1998; Égert et al. 2006; 
Dufrénot et al. 2008; Tsen 2011; Chowdhury 2012; Kia 2013; Chen et al. 2017). However, the relative 
significance of shocks to these fundamentals and the mechanisms through which they affect REER in 
WAMZ has not been extensively examined. Unlike previous literature, we focus on fundamental 
shocks to REER, since the REER is likely to move in response to unexpected rather than to expected 
changes in macroeconomic variables (Alexius and Post 2008; Kizys and Pierdzioch 2009; 
Dumrongrittikul and Anderson 2016). We therefore identify three shocks of interest from exchange 
rate determinants using a structural autoregressive model (SVAR) and assess how REER of WAMZ 
countries respond to the shocks. Notably, the increasingly large dependence of these countries on the 
export of primary commodities points to the growing importance of both external (such as oil price; 
terms of trade) and domestic (productivity; demand) shocks to the REER (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2005; 
Chen and Chen 2007; Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009; Chowdhury 2012; Dumrongrittikul and Anderson 
2016). Therefore, the relative role of common external shock on REERs is taken as the key indicator 
to characterise macroeconomic asymmetry across the countries. By asymmetry, we understand not 
only the prevalence of country-specific shocks that cause REER fluctuations, but also a different 
response  to common external shocks.  
The paper contributes to the extant empirical literature through a number of ways: first, we investigate 
the long-run and short-run relationships between the REER and its determinants using a country-by-
country Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) over the period 1980-2015. Second, we estimate and 
assess the pattern of REER misalignments using the permanent components of fundamentals as in 
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the Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) procedure. Third, we impose long-run restrictions 
in a three-vector autoregressive (VAR) model to identify economically meaningful structural shocks, 
i.e. oil price, productivity (supply) and demand preference to REER determinants over the period 
1980-2015. We consider impulse response and variance decomposition in order to characterise 
asymmetries in terms of the sign, magnitude, persistence and relative contribution of the disturbances 
across these countries. Our broad aim is to provide an empirical analysis that can inform policy 
debates on whether WAMZ economies have attained adequate macroeconomic symmetry for a 
common monetary policy to suffice.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows; Section 2 presents the data description and sources. 
Section 3 provides the empirical methodology and results, while Section 4 offers some concluding 
remarks and policy recommendations. 
2 Data Description 
The study employs annual data for five WAMZ member states (Ghana, The Gambia, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, and Guinea)6 over the period 1980-2015. The dependent variable, the REER, is calculated 
using a trade-weighted index of bilateral exchange rates, adjusted by consumer prices (see Table A1 
in the appendix). The nominal effective exchange rate is defined as the price of the domestic currency 
in terms of the trading-partner currency. The REER and other relevant variables are indexed to 100 in 
2000 (WAMZ formation year), and an increase in the index of the REER implies a real appreciation of 
the domestic currency relative to the basket of currencies of the respective trading partners, whereas 
a decline implies a real depreciation of the domestic currency. We employ real effective rates instead 
of bilateral exchange rates because the WAMZ members’ foreign exchange transactions are 
conducted in a global context with the involvement of more trading partner countries in different 
proportions.  
The domestic fundamental determinants are: The relative productivity differential7 prod, (proxy to 
capture the Balassa-Samuelson effect). This variable is constructed from real GDP per capita in PPP8 
for each WAMZ country relative to the top 5 main trading partners using the same weights as for the 
                                                          
6 The country coverage and the sample period are determined by data availability; hence, the reason for omitting Liberia. 
7 Clark and MacDonald (1999) used the ratio of the domestic consumer price index (CPI) to the wholesale price index (WPI) 
relative to the equivalent foreign (trade weighted) ratio to capture the Balassa-Samuelson effect. This ratio is designed to proxy 
the ratio of traded to non-traded price. However, data for WPI/PPI is not available for these countries. 
8 Real per capita GDP is used instead of real per capita GDP in PPP for countries where the latter is unavailable. 
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calculation of the REER series. The effect of fiscal policy is captured using the proxy variable gov 
which is the total government consumption as a percent of GDP. A proxy accounting for trade controls 
or trade openness is the variable open, constructed as the total trade (sum of exports and imports) as 
a percentage of GDP. Finally, we use the annual interest rate in percent of nominal long-term bonds9 
(10 years for most countries) minus the percentage change in the CPI index from the previous year 
relative to its effective foreign equivalent, rirr. The external fundamental determinants are: Real oil 
prices, oil and relative terms of trade tot. oil is the US dollar prices of oil converted to the domestic 
currency and then deflated by the domestic consumer price index (CPI). tot is constructed as the ratio 
of domestic export unit value to import unit value as a proportion of the equivalent effective foreign 
ratio. All the variables are expressed in natural logarithms except rirr because of some negative 
observations. The data are gathered from the International Financial Statistics (IFS), World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) and Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTs), compiled by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank, and OECD database. All 
the series used in this study are derived either directly or by computations using these datasets.  
The expected long-term signs of all the explanatory variables on the REER (𝒒𝒕) consistent with 
theoretical priors (See Obstfeld et al. 1996; Clark and MacDonald 1998; Clark and MacDonald 1999; 
Hinkle and Montiel 1999; Chen and Chen 2007: for extensive theoretical discussions) are 
summarised by (1): 
𝒒𝒕 = 𝒇( 𝒑𝒓𝒐
+, 𝒕𝒐𝒕+/−, 𝒐𝒊𝒍+/−, 𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒏−, 𝒈𝒐𝒗+/−, 𝒓𝒊𝒓𝒓+)   1 
Where +/- represents real appreciation and real depreciation of domestic currencies, respectively.   
2.1 Real effective exchange rate (REER) 
The REERs plot in Figure 1 shows considerable variation in behaviour across the five countries and 
time, reflecting the changing country-specific exchange rate policies. It is evident from the graph that 
before 1985, almost all WAMZ countries REERs consistently appreciated on average, except the 
Gambia where the REER continuously depreciated over the sample period. Afterward, a sharp 
depreciation is observed in the rest of the countries REERs between 1983-1986, with the break 
reflecting the structural economic reforms, that the countries undertook in the 1980s (Alagidede et al. 
                                                          
9 Data is not available for most WAMZ countries, therefore WDI construction is used, i.e., real interest rate is the lending 
interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. 
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2008). For instance, in Ghana, the introduction of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983 
brought about a dramatic devaluation of the effective exchange rate after maintaining an overvalued 
exchange rate for most of the 1970s (Fosu 2001). The cedi was floated by the monetary authorities 
with the onset of ERP 1983 under the guidance of the World Bank and the IMF (Boamah 2009), while 
in Nigeria the naira was floated in 1986 following the introduction of structural adjustment policies. 
Guinea’s currency was devalued in 1986. Implicit in the recommendation of a devaluation is the view 
that the real exchange rate is out of equilibrium; hence an effort to correct the serious overvaluation of 
the currency and to bring into line official and parallel market prices (WorldBank 1986).  
Figure 1: Real Effective Exchange Rate (2000=100) 
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We test each variable for the presence of a unit root by using the augmented dickey fuller (ADF) and 
Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests. The results from the ADF and PP tests show that in all cases the 
tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the series are integrated of order 1 at the 5% significance 
level, except interest rate differentials (rir), which is 𝐼(0) in all the five countries (See Table A2. in the 
Appendix). In addition, we conducted a stationarity test in the presence of structural break on the 
REER. According to Perron (1989), if there is a break in the deterministic trend, then conventional unit 
root tests may produce a misleading and biased conclusion. Hence, we employ the Perron (1997) unit 
root test with structural break to examine only the REER for the sake of brevity. Despite the structural 
breaks, the REER of WAMZ countries remain 𝐼(1), except Sierra Leone which is 𝐼(0) (see Table A3. 
in the Appendix). Interestingly, most of the breakpoints were in the 1980s, which is consistent with the 
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major economic reforms discussed above. Therefore, we have enough evidence to validate the use of 
cointegration tests. 
3 Empirical Methodology and Results  
The empirical approach of this research is twofold. First, we examine the long-run and the short-run 
relationships between the REER and the selected fundamental variables across WAMZ countries 
over the period 1980-2015. We apply individual country VECM, and further derive the equilibrium 
REER and misalignments for these countries. Second, we measure the asymmetry of 
macroeconomic shocks across these countries using a structural vector-autoregressive (SVAR) 
model. The aim is to identify and assess the responses of REER to the shocks of interest; oil price, 
productivity (supply) and demand preference. Thus, whether these shocks to REER determinants 
differ across WAMZ countries to help inform policy decision on common monetary policy for the 
group. 
3.1 Cointegration - REERs comovements  
Having determined that all the series involved in our analysis (lreer, lpro, ltot, loil, lopen, lgov) are 
𝐼(1), we proceed to the cointegration analyses of the variables (Engle and Granger 1987; Hsiao 
2014). The paper employs a vector error correction model (VECM)10 to analyse the long-run and the 
short-run relationships between the REER and the selected macroeconomic fundamentals. We first 
estimate the long-run relationship between the REER and the selected fundamentals, and then we 
determine and interpret the REER’s adjustment factor.  
We specify a simple VECM between the REER and the fundamentals that restrict the long-run 
behaviour of the endogenous variables to converge to their cointegrating relationship while allowing 
for short-run adjustment dynamics (Gervais et al. 2016) in equation 2: 
∆𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝜷
′𝒚𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝚪𝟏∆𝒚𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + ⋯ + 𝚪𝒑−𝟏∆𝒚𝒊𝒕−𝒑+𝟏 + 𝚽𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝝁𝒊𝒕    2 
Where, 𝑦𝑡 = (𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟, 𝑙𝑝𝑟𝑜, 𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑡, 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙, 𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛, 𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑣) is (6𝑥1) vector of variables, and Γ𝑖 = −(𝐼 − 𝐴1 −
⋯ − 𝐴𝑖) 𝑖 = 1,2,3, … … , 𝑝 − 1, 𝛽
′ represents the long-run equilibrium relationships between the REER 
                                                          
10 Further discussions related to VECM applications are provided by (Johansen 1995; Lütkepohl and Krätzig 2004; Enders 
2008). 
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and the fundamentals, and the 𝜶 matrix, measure the speed of adjustment of the REER. To evaluate 
REER comovement in WAMZ, we expect a significant and negative 𝜶 coefficient for all the 
participating countries. This would indicate that the REER tends to stabilise itself in the event of 
exogenous shocks. 𝑫𝒕 is a vector of deterministic components, such as constant, seasonal dummies 
and intervention dummies. 
We first estimate the 𝜷′ using the conventional Johansen cointegration tests for the time series on a 
country-by-country basis, by assuming that all variables are endogenous in the system.11 Testing for 
cointegration using the Johansen method requires testing for the reduced rank or determining the 
number of cointegrating vectors in the system (Johansen 1988; Johansen 1991; Johansen 1995). 
Therefore, both the Johansen’s trace and max-eigenvalue test statistics are used to assess whether 
the variables are cointegrated and, if so, the number of cointegrating relationships. We select an 
optimal lag of 1 for all the countries; lag selection was based on the lowest Schwarz information 
criterion (SIC) in conjunction with the observation of Gaussian errors. Although one lag is very 
restrictive even for annual data (Baffes et al. 1999), longer lag lengths leave us with very few degrees 
of freedom.12 Furthermore, the (Johansen 1992) “Pantula principle’’13 is applied in identifying the 
deterministic components for our estimation since the test can be very sensitive to the optimal lag 
length and deterministic trend components (Harris 1995).  
Table 1 reports the trace and maximum eigenvalue test of cointegration for the five countries. Based 
on the likelihood ratio statistics, we strongly reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for all 
countries at the 5% significance level. Therefore, we conclude the existence of a long-run relationship 
between the REER and fundamental determinants. A detailed analysis of the cointegrating vectors is 
provided in the next section to assess the co-movement or behaviour of the REER across WAMZ 
countries. The major implication derived from both the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests is the 
evidence of one cointegrating relation among the variables in the system of these economies. The 
                                                          
11 Johansen (1995) argue that all variables in the system must have the same order of integration. Hence, we did not include 
the I(0) variable, irr in the cointegrating space. Furthermore, The Johansen approach does not require the choice of a 
dependent variable and hence addresses the endogeneity problem of variables (MacDonald 1998). 
12 Diagnostics tests were conducted to ensure that the selected lag lengths ensure the VAR and the associated VECM model 
residual do not suffer from autocorrelation, non-normality, etc. 
13 This involves estimating three alternative models (i.e. no intercept or trend, intercept and no trend, intercept and trend) and 
moving from the most restrictive to the least restrictive model. The trace test statistic or the maximum eigenvalue test statistic is 
compared to the critical value in each case, and the most appropriate model is deemed to be the one where the null hypothesis 
is not rejected for the first time (Hatemi-J 2002). 
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results support the theory of generalized purchasing-power-parity (G-PPP)14 in WAMZ countries 
REERs (Enders and Hum 1994).  
Table 1: Johansen Cointegration Statistics 
 
Ghana The Gambia Nigeria Sierra Leone Guinea 
𝝀𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙 𝝀𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙 𝝀𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙 𝝀𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙 𝝀𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙 
Lags 1 1 1 1 1 
𝒓 = 𝟎 107.17* 41.52* 103.07* 40.53* 119.02* 46.27* 150.96* 63.94* 82.26* 40.52* 
𝒓 = 𝟏 65.65 28.41 62.53 28.47 72.75 25.67 87.01 28.30 41.74 20.82 
𝒓 = 𝟐 37.24 19.29 34.06 20.01 47.07 19.27 58.70 24.47 20.92 10.49 
No. 
of 
CE 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Note: *, ** denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% and 10% significance level respectively. We test the existence of cointegration in 
the vector conformed by (REER, TOT, PROD, OIL, OPEN, GOV) using the trace test developed by Johansen (1991;1995).  
It is important to note that our initial Johansen cointegration tests with all the fundamentals in the 
system recorded more than one cointegrating relationship in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Guinea.15 It is 
well established in the literature that the existence of multiple cointegrating vectors complicates the 
interpretation of the equilibrium relationship between the REER and its fundamental determinants and 
presents the problem of identification (Johansen 1992; Iimi 2006). Therefore, we addressed the above 
problem by omitting the 𝐼(0) variable, rir, from the cointegrating vector, while yielding just one 
cointegrating relationship.16  
3.1.1 Interpreting the cointegrating vector 
The results of the normalised cointegrating vectors for the five sample countries are reported in Table 
2. Overall, the coefficients of the estimated variables are statistically significant on at least the 5% 
level of significance. Also, the coefficients of the fundamentals- productivity differential, terms of trade, 
openness, government consumption, and real oil price- capture their long-run impact on the REER, 
but the impacts are different across economies.  
                                                          
14 The G-PPP theory suggests that the fundamental economic variables determining RER are nonstationary and if the 
fundamentals are sufficiently integrated, as in a currency area, the real rates will share common trend. 
15 (Cheung and Lai 1993; Baffes et al. 1999) argue that the likelihood ratio test of cointegration is known to be sensitive to 
small-sample bias, making the properties of the trace test different from its asymptotic properties sometimes. 
16 Harris (1995) argues that for every stationary variable included in the multivariate model, the number of cointegration 
equations will increase correspondingly. 
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1. An increase in the relative productivity differential is associated with a real appreciation 
(confirming the Balassa–Samuelson effect) in Guinea. However, the estimated coefficient 
associated with productivity differential has an unexpected sign- negative- in the remaining 
four countries, suggesting that increase productivity differentials are associated with real 
depreciation. A plausible reason is that an increase in productivity differentials might be 
generated by productivity growth in the non-traded sector of these economies, which in theory 
has unclear effects on the prices of non-traded goods.17   
2. An improvement in terms of trade is associated with an appreciation of the REER in all the 
countries, except in Nigeria. This is in line with Chudik and Mongardini (2007) argument that 
since the prices of the commodities exported by developing countries (here WAMZ members) 
are determined in the world market, an improvement in the terms of trade will positively affect 
the trade balance, and subsequently lead to REER appreciation.  
3. An increase in the degree of openness is associated with a real depreciation in all countries, 
except in Guinea where the variable is omitted in the model due to data unavailability. This 
suggests that increasing trade liberalization arrangements among these countries is 
associated with a real depreciation of the REERs; consistent with the traditional view. Thus, 
an increase in the degree of openness is associated with decreasing trade barriers, imports 
rise more than exports, and the deterioration in the trade balance results in REER 
depreciation (Égert et al. 2006). This could be the result of the high degree of trade 
liberalization arrangements that the countries have achieved through ECOWAS common 
trade policies since 1975.  
4. An expansionary government consumption on non-tradable is associated with a real 
appreciation in The Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone while the contrary, a real 
depreciation is observed in Ghana. The conflicting sign reported is consistent with the 
literature which argues that the prediction depends on the allocation of government 
consumption expenditure to tradable and non-tadable goods. But for the case that actual data 
on government expenditure on non-tradable are very limited and are almost non-existent in 
many developing countries, the actual sign of this proxy can be either positive or negative 
(Edwards 1988b; Elbadawi 1994; Elbadawi and Soto 2005; Ricci et al. 2013).  
                                                          
17 See Edwards (1988b) for further explanation 
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5. Finally, an adverse real oil price is associated with real depreciation in Ghana and The 
Gambia. This is not surprising considering that these countries are oil importing countries 
where world oil prices are denominated in foreign currencies. Hence, an increase in the real 
oil price will lead to a decrease in terms of trade and subsequently depreciate REER. On the 
other hand, an increase in real oil price is associated with a real appreciation in Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, and Guinea. The positive estimated coefficient for real oil price in Nigeria is 
expected, being a major oil exporting economy, whereas the real oil price is found to have the 
unexpected positive sign for Sierra Leone, and Guinea. 
In a nutshell, the following observations can be made based on the above cointegrating results: First, 
overall, productivity differential, terms of trade, openness, government consumption, and the real oil 
price are found to be important in the REER determination in the long run. However, the results show 
cross-country variations in the impacts of those variables on the REER, suggesting lack of 
macroeconomic policy coordination. However, Beirne (2010) argues that given differing business 
cycle, trade, and consumption patterns across developing countries, it is not feasible that all the 
coefficients will move in the same direction. Nonetheless, this reiterates the need for further policy 
coordination within the group. Second, it is worth mentioning that  although the behavioural 
equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) methodology defines the existence of a long-run relationship 
between the REER and its determinants, it is not always possible that the REER may be in 
equilibrium at every point in the long run due to possible imperfections, rigidities or regulations; 
however, equilibrium may be achieved gradually in the long-run. For that reason, the short-run 
adjustment factor is estimated in Section 3.2 to complement the long-run equilibrium model in the 
empirical analysis.  
Table 2: Results of Cointegration Estimation 
  
Ghana 𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡 = −7.1022𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜 + 0.7096𝑡𝑜𝑡 − 3.4708𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 − 0.860𝑔𝑜𝑣 − 3.195𝑜𝑖𝑙 + 1.0553𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 28.09 
        [− 5.53133]       [3.17991]     [−10.9678]      [−2.42685]    [−11.6742]   [10.9236]    
The Gambia 𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡 =  − 2.870𝑝𝑟𝑜 + 0.065𝑡𝑜𝑡 −  0.4405𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 + 0.2784𝑔𝑜𝑣 − 0.1959𝑜𝑖𝑙 −  0.0995𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 17.3978 
                        [− 6.58084]      [4.69451]    [−7.26788]       [5.66886]        [−4.60436]    [− 5.82748]                           
Guinea 𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 0.6195𝑝𝑟𝑜 + 0.5798𝑡𝑜𝑡 + 0.353𝑔𝑜𝑣 + 0.1419𝑜𝑖𝑙 − 0.0542 
       [2.16213]   [4.71414]   [5.27115]   [5.73973]  
Nigeria 𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡 =  −0.8664𝑝𝑟𝑜 − 0.500𝑡𝑜𝑡 + 0.7268𝑔𝑜𝑣 − 1.170𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 + 1.8717𝑜𝑖𝑙 − 0.4625𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 9.7600 
         [−2.10256]      [−2.51498]   [5.64570]    [−7.80483]      [7.05473]    [−7.32229]     
Sierra Leone 𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 7.753𝑝𝑟𝑜 + 2.3794𝑡𝑜𝑡 + 2.3425𝑔𝑜𝑣 −  2.1678𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 + 0.6174𝑜𝑖𝑙 −  12.9445 
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[9.83603]   [6.81112]     [4.60776]     [−8.71549]       [7.79347]   
Note: [ ] t-statistics   
Figure 2 plots the observed REER misalignments of WAMZ countries. Following (Clark and 
MacDonald 1998), REER misalignment is defined as the deviation of the actual REER (𝒒𝒕) from the 
equilibrium (?̃?𝒕) REER; where positive values indicate REER undervaluation and negative ones 
REER over-valuation. A visual inspection indicates signs of possible substantial divergences of the 
REERs from their equilibrium path. This suggests that the REERs for most countries follow paths that 
are out of line with fundamentals- misaligned. The indication is that changes in the fundamentals may 
have differentiated impacts on the REER across the countries or perhaps indicating problems of 
exchange rate management. Figure 2 shows that before 2000- the base year- there is a clear episode 
of real overvaluation and undervaluation in all the countries’ REERs. Nevertheless, considering the 
influence of different historical, economic and political traditions such as the major exchange rate 
policy changes undertaken by these countries as part of the economic reforms supervised by the IMF 
and World Bank in the 1980s and political instability, the degree of misalignments could be argued 
‘natural’ for the region. For instance, the sharp deviation between 1993-98 in Nigeria is consistent with 
the political instability the country underwent during Abacha’s military regime. Moreover, Nigeria 
remained an outlier for the most part of the period before 2000, probably due to its influence as the 
biggest economy in GDP and population amongst the group.  
Interestingly, the relative misalignments appear to have declined since 2007 as the individual 
member’s REER trend towards the common equilibrium path. This somewhat concurs with Coulibaly 
and Gnimassoun (2013) report that the dispersion of misalignments in the WAMZ area has relatively 
diminished since 2000, reflecting a convergence between competitiveness levels of its member 
countries. In other words, these countries have not gone through any excessive real devaluation since 
2007. Perhaps, we can argue that they rely more on interest rate tools for macroeconomic adjustment 
than instead of nominal exchange rate adjustments. Notwithstanding, more attempts are required to 
eliminate total misalignments amongst members and bring the REER in all countries closer to 
equilibrium. In the context of sound macroeconomic policies and stable external factors, REER could 
follow paths that are in line with fundamentals (Edwards 1988a; Isard and Faruqee 1998; Gulde and 
Tsangarides 2008; Chowdhury 2012). Therefore, as indicated in previous studies (Debrun et al. 2005; 
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Fielding and Shields 2005; Alagidede et al. 2008) a monetary union in WAMZ inevitably depends on 
how well the authorities achieve macroeconomic integration before upscaling to a full monetary union.   
Figure 2: REER Misalignment 
 
Source: Authors (2018) 
3.2 Short-run adjustment factor 
We turn next to the short-run adjustment factors or speed of adjustment of the REERs and the 
fundamentals. Though we base most of our interpretation of the impulse response in the subsequent 
section, we comment on some of the short-run adjustment coefficient estimates first. Our estimated 
equation, equation 2 suggests that when the estimated 𝜶 coefficient is negative and significant, then 
deviations from the cointegrating relationship18 can be corrected through the adjustment of the REER. 
Therefore, we further explore whether the REER in WAMZ countries respond significantly to past 
deviations. 
To ensure confidence in the VECM estimation, we examine whether the variables are weakly 
exogenous in the system since some of the variables in the cointegrating matrix are in differentials 
(differences between domestic and foreign variables) (Harris 1995; Hendry 1995). We conduct formal 
tests that the relative terms of trade, productivity differentials and real oil price are weakly exogenous. 
The null hypothesis of zero restrictions weakly exogenous cannot be rejected in most cases for these 
                                                          
18 The Engle and Granger (1987) representation theorem asserts that the existence of an error-correction representation 
depends on the existence of cointegration. 
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variables. See Table A4 in the Appendix. Also, we can assume a priori that relative terms of trade and 
world oil price as weakly exogenous. The reason is that these countries are small open economies 
and can be accepted as price-takers in international trade, i.e., they have no or little influence on the 
price of their exports or imports (Harris 1995; Opoku-Afari et al. 2004). In addition, the study 
conducted the VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests; VEC Residual Normality Tests; VEC 
Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests; inverse AR root test19 to ensure the VECM is stable and do not 
suffer from autocorrelation, non-normality, heteroscedasticity, and non-stationarity. The inverse AR 
root tests for all the countries suggest a stable (stationary) VECM. See Table A5 in the Appendix.   
The estimated short-run adjustment coefficients and the associated t-ratios are presented in Table 3. 
The adjustment coefficients shed light on the dynamics of the adjustment process towards 
equilibrium. In the event of any deviation from the long-run equilibrium, these variables jointly respond 
and adjust the system back to equilibrium. The REER adjustment factor D(lreer), is negative and 
statistically significant, as expected from theory for all the countries, except The Gambia and Sierra 
Leone. In addition, a similar speed of adjustment across these countries would imply that the 
countries REER responds symmetrically to shocks. However, the speed of adjustment D(lreer) slightly 
varies across the countries, with coefficients ranging from 0.94 in Guinea, 0.81 in Nigeria, to 0.53 in 
Ghana. For instance, an adjustment coefficient of 0.94 suggests that about 94% of any misalignment 
between the actual and equilibrium REER is corrected within a year. This show less persistent 
adjustment dynamics in Guinea’s REER relative to the remaining countries. We deduce that the other 
countries with low REER adjustment speed, e.g., Ghana, could be due to limited nominal exchange 
rate flexibility. The above adjustment factors corresponding to a half-life of the REER of 0.7 years for 
Guinea, 0.9 years for Nigeria, and 1.3 years for Ghana.20 The adjustment speed for Ghana is 
comparable to that of Asongu (2014), who finds the half-life of 1 year for the REER, but the remaining 
countries coefficients were insignificant. On the other hand, the short-run effects of the fundamentals 
are generally insignificant across the various specifications apart from the real oil price equation in 
Ghana and Guinea; productivity differentials, openness and government consumption in The Gambia. 
These variables contribute to REER realignment.  
 
                                                          
19 Results available upon request 
20 The implication is that the REER returns to equilibrium within the above listed period if it meanders from its equilibrium path. 
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Table 3: Estimated adjustment coefficients in VECM 
 Ghana The Gambia Guinea Nigeria Sierra Leone 
D(lreer) 
-0.529* 
[-2.040] 
-0.245 
[-1.126] 
-0.941* 
[-1.758] 
-0.807* 
[-3.418] 
-0.003 
[-0.043] 
D(lpro) 
0.029 
[ 2.986] 
-0.256* 
[-2.941] 
0.122 
[ 1.436] 
0.0160 
[ 0.300] 
0.138 
[ 3.962] 
D(ltot) 
0.076 
[ 0.474] 
3.075 
[ 1.587] 
0.590 
[ 1.232] 
-0.248 
[-1.082] 
-0.004 
[-0.080] 
D(loil) 
-0.318* 
[-2.349] 
1.292 
[ 1.602] 
-2.321* 
[-1.790] 
-0.414 
[-1.318] 
-0.014  
[-0.094] 
D(lopen) 
-0.002 
[-0.040] 
-1.335* 
[-2.932] 
- 
-0.201 
[-0.797] 
-0.029 
[-0.214] 
D(lgov) 
-0.050 
[-0.560] 
-1.216* 
[-2.315] 
0.825 
[ 1.257] 
-0.278 
[-1.170] 
0.108 
[ 1.448] 
Half-life of 
deviation from 
ERER in years 
1.3 - 0.7 0.9 - 
Notes: *, ** denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% and 10% significance level respectively. [ ] t-statistics   
 
 
3.3 Measuring Shock Asymmtry: Shock Identification strategy  
Building on the empirical model outlined in Section 2, our interest in this section is to examine the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) responses to shocks in exchange rate determinants across the West 
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) economies; and whether disturbances are distributed symmetrically 
across the countries. Based on the analysis in section 2, we consider three shocks representing both 
external and domestics- oil price (common external), supply (productivity) and demand preference 
shocks- that could be an important driver of REER fluctuations in the area.  
In this paper, a persistent change in world oil prices with a persistent effect on WAMZ country's REER 
would be captured as a common external shock (Forbes et al. 2015). These economies are closely 
integrated into the wider global economy with their heavy reliance on export of primary commodities; 
global or external developments affect the economic fortune of these countries. Consequently, the 
prevalence of external shocks may justify common monetary policy for the countries (Zhao and Kim 
2009). A rise in world oil price will worsen the balance of trade position of a net oil-importing country, 
subsequently lead to a real depreciation of the REER (Zhou 1995; Chen and Chen 2007). An 
increase in domestic productivity would be captured as a domestic supply shock or productivity shock. 
A supply disturbance is identified as a shock such as improvements in technology, that causes 
productivity shock in traded sectors relative to nontraded sectors. This type of productivity shock is 
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central to the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. Productivity shocks in countries with higher productivity 
in the tradable sector typically result in permanent REER appreciation (Balassa 1964; Samuelson 
1964; Edwards 1989). In addition, changes in the REER is referred here as real aggregate demand 
shocks not related to money, such as preference or fiscal shocks (Rogers 1999; Craighead and Tien 
2015). An increase in the real demand shocks such as the propensity to consume would result in 
higher prices and an appreciating REER in the long run (Alexius and Post 2008). The domestic or 
country-specific shocks are shocks that only affect a particular WAMZ member economy due to a 
change in domestic policy or a change in productivity. 
To identify asymmetric macroeconomic shocks, we estimate a three-variable VAR in first differences 
and assume that 𝑋 = [ ∆(𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡), ∆(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡), ∆(𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡)]- change in the logarithm of the real oil price (𝑜𝑡), the 
logarithm of the productivity differential (𝑝𝑡) and changes in the logarithm of the real effective  
exchange rate (𝑟𝑡)- are related to three uncorrelated structural innovations, 𝜀𝑡 = [ 𝜀𝑡
𝑜,  𝜀𝑡
𝑠,  𝜀𝑡
𝑑]. The 
structural shocks are unobserved. Hence we estimate a reduced form 𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑝) with a lag length (𝑝) 
chosen such that the residuals approximate white noise by imposing appropriate identifying 
restrictions on 𝐴 0
−1. Under the appropriate restrictions, structural shocks can be recovered from the 
estimated reduced form errors by using the following relationship: 
𝒆𝒕 = 𝑨 𝟎
−𝟏𝜺𝒕          3 
Where 𝑒𝑡  denotes the reduced-form errors. To derive three types of structural shocks: oil price 
(𝜀𝑡
𝑜), supply (𝜀𝑡
𝑠) and demand (𝜀𝑡
𝑑), we need nine constricted conditions for the model including 
three endogenous variables. The orthogonality of the structural shocks (unit variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑡) = 𝐼) 
identifying assumption provides six restrictions to identify matrix 𝐴 0
−1. The other identifying 
assumptions are the long-run restrictions, which gives as the following recursive structure of the 
model:  
𝑒𝑡 ≡ [
∆(𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡)
∆(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡)
∆(𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡)
] = [
𝑎11𝑖 0 0
𝑎21𝑖 𝑎22𝑖 0
𝑎31𝑖 𝑎32𝑖 𝑎33𝑖
] [
𝜀𝑡
𝑜
 𝜀𝑡
𝑠
 𝜀𝑡
𝑑
]  
The lower triangularity of the model can be justified as follows: (1) WAMZ country-specific shocks do 
not have a contemporaneous effect on the world oil price. This restriction is necessary to identify 
domestic shocks, and holds for small open economies, such as the countries under investigation. The 
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assumption that small open economies cannot affect the rest of the world is commonly employed in 
the literature (Zhao and Kim 2009; Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes 2013; Forbes et al. 2015).21 (2) In 
the long run, productivity is only affected by supply-side shocks (𝜀𝑡
𝑠), such as technology shock 
(Blanchard and Quah 1989), while the real exchange rate can be affected by both supply and demand 
side factors (Craighead and Tien 2015).  
It is worth noting that whereas the three structural innovations may mix various underlying shocks, our 
focus is on whether commonalities exist in WAMZ country's REER after the three structural shocks 
and how significant they are proportional to each other.  
3.3.1 Impulse response analysis 
We compute impulse response functions to determine the behaviour of shocks to the exchange rate 
fundamentals across WAMZ countries. The same data used in the VECM analysis is used for the 
impulse responses. We mainly focus on the responses of the real effective exchange rate to three 
structural innovations- oil price, productivity and demand preference shocks. The prevalence of 
structural shocks may justify common monetary policy for the group; especially the oil price (external) 
shock. A shock is considered to be symmetric if the sign, magnitude, and persistence of the 
responses do not vary significantly across countries, otherwise it is considered as asymmetric 
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1992; Ballabriga et al. 1999). In estimating the three-VAR model, the 
number of lags is set to one, since the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) indicated that all the 
models had an optimal lag length of either one or two. We chose a uniform lag of one to preserve the 
symmetry of the specification across countries. 
Figure 3 reports the cumulative impulse responses of real exchange rate movements to one-
standard-deviation oil price, supply (productivity) and demand shocks over fifteen years in each 
country. The use of accumulated responses helps to aid interpretation. The dynamic effect of each 
structural innovations is reported with a standard deviation band around the point estimate. Recall 
that the exchange rate is defined, so that an increase in the value of the real exchange rate 
appreciates the real value of domestic currency. Initial observation of Figure 3 shows that the 
                                                          
21 The key assumption for the purposes of estimation and inference is that global variables are weakly exogenous, compatible 
with a limited degree of weak dependence across idiosyncratic shocks. To satisfy this property, we assume that all economies 
in the model are small to the world economy, which is reasonable given that our country group consists of developing countries 
(Dumrongrittikul and Anderson 2016). 
19 
 
response of the REER to the three structural shocks differ across countries and the shock is felt 
immediately in all countries; it peaks about two to three years later. In The Gambia and Sierra Leone, 
an adverse oil price shock (increase in the real price of oil) depreciates the REER within the first two 
to three years, after which  we observe a permanent depreciation of  the REER. In contrast, an 
increase in the real price of oil permanently appreciates the REER in Guinea, Nigeria, and Ghana. 
The result is not surprising for Nigeria, being a major oil exporting country.  
Furthermore, a supply shock (productivity improvement) permanently tends to lead to an appreciation 
of the REER in Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. This corresponds with the traditional Balassa-
Samuelson view. In contrast, The Gambia REER depreciates permanently after a supply shock. In 
Ghana, supply shock has an initial depreciating effect on REER but after that dies out. Though the 
contrasting findings could reflect the different economic experience and the structure of the WAMZ 
members, the impact of productivity shock also depends on the transmission mechanism. Thus, 
whether through the REER is based on tradables prices or through relative prices between tradables 
and nontradables (Wang et al. 2013). In addition, a demand shock has a permanent appreciating 
effect on the REER in all countries, though the immediate impact of a one-unit demand shock varies  
across countries.     
Overall, the impulse response analysis  indicates that there are notable differences in the results. The 
response of the REER to oil price, supply (productivity) and demand shocks across the five countries 
are asymmetric. The indication is that response to the common monetary policy after a shock would 
vary across the WAMZ countries; hence, the costs of WAMZ members losing monetary autonomy will 
be much larger in a world where a monetary response to a shock is immediate. 
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Figure 3: Cumulated impulse responses of real effective exchange rates to one standard 
deviation structural innovations.  
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3.3.2 Forecast error variance decomposition analysis 
The variance decomposition is applied to identify the relative contribution of the three structural 
shocks on REER fluctuations across the countries. The aim is to investigate whether the sources of 
variation in the REER are common across the countries. Table 4 reports on the variance 
decomposition for each of the five sampled country’s REER at the 1 and 10-year forecast horizons 
(Variance decompositions are reported only for the effective real exchange rate). One (10) year 
responses are taken as short-term (long-term) effects. 
The important contributors of the REER are different across economies, shown in Table 4. In the 
short run, REER fluctuations are driven mostly by country-specific preference demand shocks; 
explaining over 80 percent of the variability the first year across The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, and 
Nigeria. The relative contribution of demand preference shocks declines gradually afterward, but none 
less than 70 percent. However, the findings are different in Sierra Leone; demand shocks contribute 
to about 42 and 45 percent of REER fluctuations in the short and long run, respectively. The 
dominance of domestic demand shocks in REER fluctuations concurs with those found in 
(Hoffmaister et al. 1998) for non-CFA countries. Also, we find significant differences in the relative 
importance of supply (productivity) shocks on REER fluctuations. In the short run, supply shock 
contribution is less than 8% across the five countries; and is almost irrelevant to the REER variability- 
less than 1 percent- in The Gambia and Guinea. The pattern is almost the same in the long run  in the 
Gambia, Guinea, and Nigeria, where supply shocks explain no more than 3 percent of REER 
variability. In Ghana and Sierra Leone, the contribution of supply shock to REER movements rises to 
13 and 12 percent in the long run, respectively.   
Furthermore, the relative importance of oil price (external) shock to REER dynamics is 54, 12, 8, 5 
and 3 percent in Sierra Leone, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, and Nigeria in the short run, respectively. In 
the long run, the pattern is almost the same in Ghana and The Gambia; marginally rises to 11 percent 
in Guinea; substantially rises to 20 percent in Nigeria; and declines to 44 percent in Sierra Leone. The 
result is not surprising, especially for Nigeria, because of the country’s heavy dependence on exports 
of crude oil; whereas the other countries are oil importing countries, exposing these countries to trade 
and exchange rate fluctuations. Hoffmaister et al. (1998) on the other hand, reported the absence of 
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the role of external shocks in explaining real exchange rate movements in the non-CFA countries; 
though the authors used world interest rate and terms of trade shocks as a proxy for external shocks. 
Overall, the sources of REER variability are idiosyncratic, and they vary significantly across countries. 
Table A6 in the appendix also shows similar asymmetric shocks across WAMZ after we replaced oil 
price shock with terms of trade shock as a common external shock to these countries. The structure 
and the different economic experience of these economies could contribute to the contrasting 
importance of the structural shocks on the REER. This result somewhat reinforces the early findings 
that structural shocks are more asymmetric among WAMZ countries. Therefore, these countries will 
find it difficult to adjust to either common external, supply or demand shocks if they form a monetary 
union.   
Table 4: Variance decomposition 
Horizon Demand 
shock 
Supply 
shock 
Oil 
price 
shock 
Demand 
shock 
Supply 
shock 
Oil price 
shock 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Ghana    Gambia   
1 80.25 7.84 11.91 94.91 0.33 4.76 
2 75.60 12.43 11.98 93.20 1.53 5.27 
3 75.66 12.40 11.94 93.21 1.52 5.27 
4 75.58 12.48 11.94 93.20 1.53 5.27 
5 75.57 12.49 11.94 93.20 1.53 5.27 
10 75.57 12.49 11.94 93.20 1.53 5.27 
       
Guinea    Nigeria   
1 92.11 0.01 7.89 95.00 2.33 2.67 
2 89.03 0.05 10.93 78.44 2.03 19.52 
3 88.93 0.15 10.92 77.90 2.39 19.72 
4 88.92 0.16 10.92 77.86 2.42 19.72 
5 88.92 0.16 10.92 77.86 2.42 19.72 
10 88.92 0.16 10.92 77.86 2.42 19.72 
       
Sierra 
Leone 
      
1 41.74 4.25 54.01    
2 44.61 11.71 43.69    
3 44.57 11.93 43.50    
4 44.57 11.93 43.50    
5 44.57 11.93 43.50    
10 44.57 11.93 43.50    
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4 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations  
One basic precondition that determines the ability to conduct monetary policy smoothly in a monetary 
union is the symmetry of response to common policy across different countries. In this paper, we 
focus on one of the main issues in the debate of monetary union in the West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ), whether shocks that cause macroeconomic fluctuations are symmetric or not across these 
countries. Consequently, we assess the behaviour of real effective exchange rates (REER) across 
these countries to characterise macroeconomic asymmetry. The analysis is conducted  twofold:  
First, we estimate the short-run and long-run effects of macroeconomic fundamentals on REERs to 
assess the behaviour of real effective exchange rates (REER) across these countries using country-
by-country VECM. We further derive the equilibrium REER and misalignments for these countries to 
examine whether they are converging over time towards the equilibrium. Overall, productivity 
differentials, terms of trade, real oil price, government consumption and trade openness are found to 
be important determinants of REER in the long run in WAMZ. However, the significant impact of the 
common fundamentals on REER are different across economies. Also, the country-specific VECM 
results show the existence of REER mean reversion in 3 countries, but the speed of adjustment 
varies across candidate countries. Furthermore, the computed REER misalignments suggest that 
before 2007 the REER of WAMZ members experienced high divergence from equilibrium path. The 
degree of REER misalignments appears to diminish, converging towards equilibrium between 2007-
2015. 
Second, we identify three types of shocks- oil price, productivity (supply) and demand preference 
shocks- from exchange rate determinants using the structural autoregressive model (SVAR) and 
assess how REERs respond to these shocks to characterise asymmetry across WAMZ. From the 
impulse response analysis, there appear to be marked differences in the effects of oil price (external) 
shock among the WAMZ countries REER. Whereas real oil price shock lead to a permanent real 
appreciation in Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana, the contrary is observed in The Gambia and Sierra 
Leone. The response of REER to supply (productivity) shock across the five countries are also 
asymmetric. Though the response of REER to domestic aggregate demand shocks are positive for all 
countries, they differ in size and speed, indicating idiosyncratic aggregate demand shock. In the case 
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of the variance decomposition, the sources of REER variability are idiosyncratic, and they vary 
significantly across countries.  
The overall evidence from the empirical investigation  points to heterogeneous economies. The 
structure and the different economic experience of these economies could contribute to the structural 
differences. Our findings imply that, in the absence of an alternative adjustment mechanism (such as 
fiscal transfer schemes), a move towards monetary union will be associated with significant cost to 
the countries in a world where a monetary response to a shock is immediate. Idiosyncratic shocks 
imply the need for different policy responses to adjust to macroeconomic shocks. This strengthens the 
case for policy autonomy in the region and  is consistent with previous studies showing considerable 
economic divergences amongst WAMZ countries as the main constraint to monetary union.  
Notwithstanding, there is a case for monetary union, but it is indispensable that authorities appreciate 
the potential asymmetries from common policies and shocks. Furthermore, we argue that to avoid 
asymmetric responses from policy changes; (1) structural transformations and economic 
diversifications are critical. This requires scaling up toward activities with higher technology (at least 
small-scale manufacturing), which can transform the raw materials and primary commodities 
efficiently into manufactured goods would yield significant dividends regionally (Rodrik 2007; Stiglitz 
and Greenwald 2014; Guzman et al. 2018). This concurs with (Kenen 1969) that the more diversified 
an economy is, the less vulnerable it is to sector specific shocks and the smaller is the stabilization 
cost of joining a monetary union (2) Member countries ought to increase both political and economic 
commitments towards the project and by incorporating regional integration objectives into national 
development programmes. By so doing, there will be a harmonized development policy aimed at 
fostering greater compatibility and subsequently achieve convergence between national and regional 
plans.  
The analysis of shock asymmetry still provides springboards for future research; for example, 
assessing the possibility of increased business cycle correlation synchronisation with a common 
currency through increased trade among the countries (Frankel and Rose 1998). 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Trade Weight Used in Construction of REER and Fundamentals 
Country Main trade partners Total 
Ghana EU (Germany) China S/A US UK  
A 28.30% 11.58% 10.74% 5.98% 3.87% 60.74 
B 0.47 0.20 0.18 0.10 0.06 1 
Nigeria US China India EU 
(Germany) 
UK  
A 14.06% 10.42% 8.50% 13.89% 4.08% 50.95% 
B 0.28 0.2 0.17 0.27 0.08 1 
Gambia China CFA 
(Senegal) 
EU (Germany) UK India  
A 25.40% 19.17% 5.32% 2.30% 10.75% 62.94 
B 0.4 0.3 0.08 0.04 0.17 1 
Liberia South Korea China EU (Germany) US Japan  
A 25.65% 15.63% 20.26% 7.91% 3.28% 72.73% 
B 0.35 0.21 0.28 0.11 0.05 1 
Guinea EU (Germany) China India US Chile  
A 26.99% 11.31% 11.50% 4.76% 6.30% 60.86% 
B 0.44 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.10 1 
Sierra Leone China EU 
(Germany) 
UK US S/A  
A 28.32% 19.52% 5.32% 4.81% 3.53% 61.50 
B 0.46 0.32 0.09 0.08 0.06 1 
Source: Author’s (2017). A: Trade weight (% of total trade) B: Normalized Trade weight 
The following procedure was followed in the construction of REER indexes: 
1. The trade weights (𝑤𝑖) were constructed using Zanello and Desruelle (1997) methodology 
and data gathered from the International Monetary Fund Directions of Trade (DOTs). The 
computed weights are in table 1. 
2. The trading partners chosen were the 5 major trading countries whose trade level accounted 
for over 50% out of total trade averaged for the period 2010-2014.  
3. In all cases the NEER between these countries and their trading partners were obtained from 
IMF IFS; CPI for trading partners were obtained from IFS and WDI. The CPI and NEER are 
all re-based so that they all equal 100 in 2000.   
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Table A2 Time Series Unit Root Testing 
  ADF PP  
Country Variables  Level First Difference Level  First Difference Decision 
  Constant 
Constant 
& trend 
Constant 
Constant 
& trend 
Constant 
Constant 
& trend 
Constant 
Constant 
& trend 
 
Ghana Lreer -1.553 -1.866 -6.125*** -6.259***  -1.374  -1.870  -6.124*** -6.626*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Ltot -2.0774 -2.464  -7.292*** -6.065*** -2.060 -2.440 -7.273*** -8.511*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Lpro 1.652 -2.904 -3.432** -4.035** 1.652 -2.305 -3.544** -4.126** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 loil -1.189 -1.831 -5.404*** -5.398*** -1.243 -1.831 -5.319*** -5.334*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Lgov -1.288 -2.915  -4.886*** -4.810*** -1.382 -3.195 -8.045*** -8.250*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 rir -4.008*** -5.275*** - - -3.992*** -5.400*** - - 𝑰(𝟎) 
 Lopen -2.921 -2.808 -6.097*** -7.634*** -1.397 -1.679 -4.814*** -5.036*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
The 
Gambia 
Lreer -0.271 -2.463  -5.121*** -5.085*** -0.217  -2.224 -5.122*** -5.087*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Ltot -2.430  -2.848 -6.242*** -6.156*** -2.472 -2.310 -6.320*** -6.212*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Lpro -0.973 -2.526  -7.615*** -8.193*** -0.884 -2.515  -7.801*** -7.629*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 loil -0.867 -2.318 -5.453*** -5.353*** -0.860 -2.318 -5.430*** -5.302*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Lgov -1.904 -2.235 -7.941*** -8.135*** -1.728  -2.483  -8.709*** -9.968*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 rir -4.464*** -5.558*** - - -4.492*** -5.596*** - - 𝑰(𝟎) 
 Lopen -1.839 -1.920 -7.039*** -7.034*** -1.756  -1.826  -7.056*** -7.058*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
Nigeria Lreer -1.931  -1.771  -4.403***  -4.416*** -2.087  -1.771 -4.312***  -4.243** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Ltot -1.668 -2.018 -4.451*** -4.544*** -1.709 -1.921  -5.271*** -5.309*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Lpro -1.962 -2.716  -4.729*** -5.348*** -2.084 -2.684  -4.721*** -5.354*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 loil -0.508 -2.911 -6.374*** -6.236*** -0.465 -2.820 -6.392*** -6.244*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Lgov -2.593 -2.622  -6.540*** -6.460*** -2.588 -2.644  -6.574*** -6.494*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 rir -5.724*** -6.533*** - - -5.724*** -7.278*** - - 𝑰(𝟎) 
 Lopen -1.922 -1.803  -7.574*** -7.561*** -1.936 -1.821 -7.529*** -7.526*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
Sierra 
Leone 
Lreer -1.408 -1.180 -4.490*** -4.563*** -1.545 -1.558 -4.473*** -4.497*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Ltot -0.652 -2.025 -4.884*** -4.787*** -0.677 -2.029  -4.882*** -4.728*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Lpro -1.795 -1.222  -5.070*** -5.378*** -1.791 -1.106  -5.070*** -5.097*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 loil -1.885 0.087 -4.540*** -5.152*** -1.795 -0.056 -4.658*** -5.152*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Lgov -2.733 -3.081  -9.567*** -9.433*** -2.650 -3.499  -9.740*** -9.623*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 rir -3.375** -4.687*** - - -3.323** -4.662*** - - 𝑰(𝟎) 
 Lopen -2.639 -3.117  -7.120*** -7.108*** -2.767 -3.150 -7.070*** -7.071*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
Guinea Lreer -1.867 -1.999  -5.694*** -5.738*** -1.830 -2.075  -5.720*** -5.825*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Ltot -2.046 -2.270  -6.081*** -5.990*** -1.952 -2.231  -6.157*** -6.047*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Lpro -0.811 -1.911  -3.779*** -3.701** -0.786 -1.650 -3.740*** -3.660** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 loil -0.850 -1.736 -4.721*** -4.626*** -0.853 -1.912 -4.713*** -4.617*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Lgov -1.120  -0.913  -4.198*** -4.354*** -1.382 -1.166  -4.084*** -4.353*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 rir - - - - - - - - - 
 Lopen -1.672 -2.290  -6.364*** -6.339*** -1.592 -2.220  -6.571*** -6.600*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
Note:*** and **denotes statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level to reject the unit root null hypothesis, respectively. 
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Table A3. Perron (1997) unit root test with structural break REER 
 Levels First difference Decision 
Country  t-stat  Year Break  t-stat Year Break  
Ghana -3.954     (1) 1986 -6.436*** (0) 1988 𝑰(𝟏) 
Gambia -4.203     (0) 2001 -6.249*** (0) 2003 𝑰(𝟏) 
Nigeria -4.014     (1) 1986 -5.287*** (0) 1987 𝑰(𝟏) 
Sierra Leone -4.803*** (0) 1986 - - 𝑰(𝟎) 
Guinea -3.926     (0) 1985 -6.624*** (0) 1986 𝑰(𝟏) 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the lag order. The lag parameters are selected based on the AIC. Null Hypothesis: LREER has a unit 
root with a structural break in the intercept. *** and **denotes statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level to reject the unit root null hypothesis, 
respectively  
 
Table A4. LR statistics for testing weak exogeneity of the foreign and external (oil price) variables 
  Ghana Gambia Nigeria Sierra Leone Guinea 
D(lpro) 𝜒2 (1) 8.494 8.514 0.065 10.143 1.320 
p-value 0.003 0.003 0.798 0.001 0.250 
D(ltot) 𝜒2 (1) 0.328 3.221 0.898 0.006 1.710 
p-value 0.566 0.072 0.343 0.935 0.190 
D(loil) 𝜒2 (1) 7.449 3.633 1.206 0.008 2.854 
p-value 0.006 0.056 0.271 0.926 0.091 
D(lopen) 𝜒2 (1) 0.002 0.145 0.467 0.048 - 
p-value 0.966 0.702 0.494 0.826 - 
D(lgov) 𝜒2 (1) 0.487 3.422 1.219 1.997 1.230 
p-value 0.485 0.064 0.269 0.157 0.267 
Notes: The weak exogeneity test is performed by imposing zero restrictions on the 𝜶𝒊 matrix in the error correction equations.  
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Table A5. VECM Diagnostic Tests 
 
Ghana     
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
 
 
The Gambia 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
 
 
Guinea 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nigeria 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
 
 
Sierra Leone 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
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Table A6. Variance decomposition 
Horizon Demand 
Shock 
Supply 
shock 
Terms of 
trade 
shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Supply 
shock 
Terms of 
trade shock 
 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Ghana    The Gambia   
1 81.56 13.02 5.42 98.71 1.01 0.28 
2 76.50 15.59 7.91 94.91 1.17 3.92 
3 76.34 15.72 7.94 94.03 1.38 4.60 
4 76.20 15.79 8.01 93.78 1.44 4.78 
5 76.18 15.81 8.01 93.71 1.46 4.83 
6 76.18 15.81 8.01 93.70 1.47 4.84 
10 76.17 15.82 8.01 93.69 1.47 4.84 
       
Guinea    Nigeria   
1 86.00 0.30 13.70 81.77 5.35 12.88 
2 84.62 0.81 14.57 79.69 6.54 13.77 
3 83.72 1.87 14.41 79.76 6.52 13.72 
4 83.72 1.88 14.41 79.76 6.52 13.72 
5 83.72 1.88 14.41 79.76 6.52 13.72 
6 83.72 1.88 14.41 79.76 6.52 13.72 
10 83.72 1.88 14.41 79.76 6.52 13.72 
       
Sierra Leone       
1 99.14 0.53 0.33    
2 92.48 4.47 3.05    
3 92.19 4.74 3.07    
4 92.15 4.77 3.08    
5 92.15 4.77 3.08    
6 92.15 4.77 3.08    
10 92.15 4.77 3.08    
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